Assessing Indonesia’s Strategic Ambiguity Amid Great Power Rivalry
Over the past decade, the Indo-Pacific region has become the main stage of a new great power geopolitical rivalry between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. This great power rivalry has significantly affected global security, economy, and diplomatic affairs in many ways. The rivalry is driven by Beijing ambition to reshape global governance towards multipolarity while directly challenging US influence amid China’s recent rapid development. However, the US is determined to counter China in its effort and maintain its primacy in the world.
According to the World Bank, China has averaged economic growth around 9% every year since the country opened and reform. This unprecedented economic growth has driven China’s recent ambition under Xi Jinping to challenge the US dominated unipolar world order. This effort includes promoting alternative international systems that emphasize sovereignty, multipolarity, and non-interference in international organizations and institutions such as BRICS and SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization). Increasing its global footprint and influence through its Belt and Road Initiative infrastructure projects. China has also increased its assertiveness in the region through constant political and military pressure on Taiwan, and also in the South China Sea where China’s nine dash line claim overlapped with several other countries’ territory. China’s “grey zone” warfare strategy, which involves using non-military and para-military tools to assert its claims without crossing the threshold of armed conflict, is a key component of this effort.
The US has responded to these challenges given by China in multiple ways. First is the US has increased its military presence in the Pacific, strengthened its alliance with allied countries such as Japan, Australia, Philippines, and military posturing aimed to deter further moves from Beijing. This is evident seeing the US deployment of the Typhoon missile system in Japan and deployment of HIMARS in Philippines, further security partnership between the US, UK, and Australia with AUKUS, freedom of navigation naval operations in contested waters that China claim, and military exercise and training with US partners such as Balikatan large scale US military exercise in Philippines. Furthermore, the US President Trump has also recently decided to enact tariffs for Chinese exports, aiming to reduce trade deficits. Although these efforts serve Washington interest to deter and counter China, it has also increased the tensions between the two countries.
Amid this rivalry, Indonesia has found itself in a unique yet complex situation. As Indonesia is the largest country in South East Asia in terms of both territory and population. Furthermore Indonesia commands critical maritime routes such as the Malacca Strait and the Natuna Sea that are strategic for global trade and energy flows. Its vast archipelago, large population, and status as a middle power make it a key player in the Indo-Pacific.
Economically, Indonesia has deep ties with China, which is Indonesia largest trading partner and also its major investor. This is because of Beijing’s large investments in many of Indonesia’s infrastructure projects through its Belt and Road Initiative. For example, the Jakarta-Bandung high speed railway where China investments and technical expertise played a significant role in the project. However, China’s nine dash line claim in South China Sea which overlapped with Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone around the Natuna island has created some difficulties and tensions between the two countries. Despite this, it is still necessary for Jakarta to maintain positive relations with Beijing considering the importance of Chinese investments and trade for Indonesia’s national development.
On the other hand, Indonesia has chosen to continue and in fact increase its strong partnership with the US in the security and defense sector. This is because of the US push for “free and open Indo-Pacific” aligned with Indonesia maritime security interests, particularly in the South China Sea. The recent increase in security and defense partnership between Indonesia and the US is highlighted with the recent increase in Indonesia military procurements from the US and expansion in joint US-Indonesia military exercise. However, this increase in defense partnership with the US could risk escalating tensions with China, requiring a delicate balance in foreign policy.
Indonesia has responded to this geopolitical rivalry by maintaining its “free and active” foreign policy doctrine, where it does not align itself with either power, but still actively engages in international diplomacy. With this doctrine, Jakarta has maintained close diplomatic relations and cooperation with both Beijing and Washington without actually taking a definitive side. Indonesia’s ability to remain balanced allows it to secure economic benefits from China while maintaining defense ties with the US, though it also exposes the country to constant external pressure. This non-alignment strategy has been implemented since Jokowi’s presidency and is still being implemented in the current Prabowo presidency.
However it seems that Prabowo took more of an active role in shaping Indonesia foreign policy compared to his predecessor. This is evident in seeing how often President Prabowo travels to meet with foreign leaders and how often he is to receive foreign leaders visiting his country. For example, President Prabowo has recently made a visit to China during its victory day parade, while also inviting French president Emmanuel Macron to Indonesia previously. In addition, Indonesia has also announced its membership in the BRICS organization, signaling support for multipolarity and desire for a greater role in global governance.
This shows that Indonesia, as a middle power, is willing to actively engage in international diplomacy. Although Indonesia is still reluctant to take a definitive side as Jakarta strength lies in its non-alignment. By maintaining non-alignment, it is possible for Indonesia to extract beneficial concessions or deals from competing superpowers. Furthermore, in response to territorial dispute and regional uncertainty, the nation’s military under Prabowo presidency has undergone significant modernizations through procurement from a diverse range of sources. This is to strengthen the country’s deterrence while also reducing dependence on its military supply.
It can be argued that Indonesia has adopted a rational and adaptive approach in its foreign policy for a middle power caught between two major powers. This is done by maintaining the balance between China and US relations and maintaining pragmatic and cooperative relations with both great powers. Siding with either one while antagonizing the other would only be detrimental to the overall Indonesia national interests and credibility.
For the South China Sea dispute in Natuna, the goal should be realistic as the prospect of China yielding its nine-dash line claim is unlikely. Instead of provoking or trying to defeat China, the goal should be to constrain its choices and offer incentives for restraint. Indonesia should maintain sovereignty not through direct confrontation and risk worsening relationship with China, but by persistent presence in the Natuna islands, legal clarity, and regional coalition building to raise the diplomatic cost of China’s coercion.
To avoid the perception of weaknesses or appeasement in the South China Sea, Indonesia should clearly communicate its red lines domestically and internationally and backed this with consistent and visible actions to demonstrate resolve. Indonesia could also take a more prominent role in ASEAN to build credibility as a regional leader. All of this is to build and increase national leverage in the regional geopolitical landscape in the face of an uncertain global situation and thus safeguard national interests. Ultimately, Indonesia’s best foreign policy path is to maintain its non-alignment and maintain close relationships with both powers. While also being firm in its sovereignty, flexible in diplomacy, and credible in international affairs.
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