{"id":5424,"date":"2026-03-04T12:18:04","date_gmt":"2026-03-04T05:18:04","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/student-activity.binus.ac.id\/himhi\/?p=5424"},"modified":"2026-03-04T12:18:04","modified_gmt":"2026-03-04T05:18:04","slug":"the-world-after-new-start","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/student-activity.binus.ac.id\/himhi\/2026\/03\/the-world-after-new-start\/","title":{"rendered":"The World After New START"},"content":{"rendered":"<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><b><i>Introduction: What is New START?<\/i><\/b><b><br \/>\n<\/b> <span style=\"font-weight: 400\">The New START treaty, formally known as <\/span><b><i>Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, <\/i><\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">has expired as of 5 February 2026, leaving the world without any legally binding limits on both U.S and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals for the first time since the <\/span><b><i>1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)<\/i><\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">. The expiration of the New START treaty marks the erosion of the last pillar for U.S.-Russia nuclear arms control, increasing systemic uncertainty, weakening and threatening global non-proliferation norms, and further reshaping strategic calculations across both major and minor powers.<\/span> <span style=\"font-weight: 400\">The treaty was first announced on March 26, 2010, and then formally signed on April 8, 2010, in Prague, Czech Republic, under U.S. President <\/span><b>Barack <\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">and Russian President <\/span><b>Dmitry Medvedev.<\/b> <span style=\"font-weight: 400\">The treaty itself later entered into force on February 5, 2011, superseding the ongoing nuclear arms treaty <\/span><b><i>The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) <\/i><\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">that was initially supposed to end on December 31, 2012.<\/span><b>\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">The duration of the treaty itself was set to last over 10 years, ending in 2021. Shortly after <\/span><b>President Joe Biden<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> was sworn into office, he extended the treaty, pushing the final expiration date of the treaty to February 5, 2026<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">The New START imposed three key limits:<\/span><\/p>\n<ul style=\"text-align: justify\">\n<li><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">No more than <\/span><b>1.550<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> deployed strategic warheads for both sides<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul style=\"text-align: justify\">\n<li><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">No more than <\/span><b>700<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> deployed ICBMS, SLBMs, and heavy bombers for both sides<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul style=\"text-align: justify\">\n<li><b>800<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> deployed and non-deployed launchers<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Yet the treaty\u2019s true significance lies beyond these numerical caps. Its most stabilising feature was its verification regime, which included on-site inspections, annual data exchanges, and detailed notification requirements. These mechanisms are what reduced uncertainty, limited any worst-case scenario military planning, and provided predictability between the world\u2019s two largest nuclear powers.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><b><i>The Move Away from &#8220;Declaratory&#8221; Control (SORT)<\/i><\/b><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">To understand the structural importance of New START, it must be situated within the broader trajectory of post-Cold War arms control. The treaty did not emerge out of nowhere or in isolation, it was negotiated to address any shortcomings in its predecessor, the <\/span><b><i>Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT)<\/i><\/b><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><b>SORT, <\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">also known as the <\/span><b>Moscow Treaty,<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> was the same nuclear arms control treaty, the predecessor to the New START. The treaty itself was signed by <\/span><b>President George W Bush <\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">and <\/span><b>President Vladimir Putin <\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">on May 20, 2002. The treaty committed both states to reduce deployed strategic nuclear warheads to between <\/span><b>1.700<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> and <\/span><b>2.200<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> by December 31, 2012.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">However, SORT reflected a markedly different principle of arms control compared to earlier agreements. It contained only a few pages of text, imposed no independent verification regime, and relied heavily on mechanisms that are inherited from earlier frameworks such as <\/span><b><i>Strategic Arms Limitation Talks <\/i><\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">and <\/span><b>START I<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">, Crucially;<\/span><\/p>\n<ol style=\"text-align: justify\">\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400\"><b>No detailed verification regime<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> (the treaty itself is still heavily reliant on SALT I mechanisms),<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400\"><b>Warheads<\/b> <b>could be removed<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> from deployment but <\/span><b>not destroyed.<\/b><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><b><i>Why Replace SORT With New START?<\/i><\/b><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Why did they replace SORT in the first place? Why didn\u2019t they extend the already existing nuclear arms control treaty? From the US perspective, the Obama administration sought to strengthen transparency mechanisms, a legally binding verification, and a restoration of arms control credibility. This made the New START more institutionalised and more rigorous compared to its predecessor, SORT. Secondly, U.S.\u2013Russia relations were becoming more strained, increasing the value of legally binding inspection frameworks<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">New START, therefore, reintroduced on-site inspections, data exchanges, and notification requirements that had lapsed after START I\u2019s expiration. Unlike SORT\u2019s declaratory reductions, New START embedded detailed and numerical limits within the framework and legally bound both nations.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><b><i>What Changes Now That It Has Expired?<\/i><\/b><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">If the transition from SORT to New START was a move towards an \u201cInstitutional Rigor\u201d, the 2026 expiration is a violent leap backward, to say the least. For the first time since the Nixon administration in 1972, the world\u2019s two nuclear superpowers are operating in a legal vacuum, effectively we have \u201cun-learned\u201d the lessons of the Cold War, trading verified certainty for a \u201cWild West\u201d of strategic ambiguity and as of now the<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> U.S. and Russia now hold approximately <\/span><b>85\u201390% of the world\u2019s nuclear warheads<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> (SIPRI, 2024).<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\">\n<p style=\"text-align: center\"><b>Figure 1 &#8211; <\/b><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Global Nuclear Inventories, January 2024<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><a href=\"http:\/\/student-activity.binus.ac.id\/himhi\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/42\/2026\/03\/Screenshot-2026-03-04-at-12.08.47.png\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"aligncenter size-full wp-image-5425\" src=\"http:\/\/student-activity.binus.ac.id\/himhi\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/42\/2026\/03\/Screenshot-2026-03-04-at-12.08.47.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"1328\" height=\"613\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Note. <\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">This image illustrates the distribution of deployed, stored, and retired warheads around the nine nuclear-armed states as of early 2024. The data of the stored and retired counts are estimates based on the available data. From <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">World Nuclear Forces, <\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">by H.M. Kristensen et al., 2024, SIPRI (<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.sipri.org\/yearbook\/2024\/07\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">https:\/\/www.sipri.org\/yearbook\/2024\/07<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">).<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\">\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">\u00a0Under New START, these were \u201ccaged\u201d by the <\/span><b>1.550 <\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">deployed limit. Without the legally binding cap, both nations now possess significant <\/span><b>\u201cupload capacity.\u201d<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> For example, the U.S. could technically just double its deployed warhead count by simply filling the empty slots that are present in Minuteman III and Trident II missiles that were kept vacant to abide by the treaty that has now expired (CSIS, 2026). And as noted before, the lack of a cap means there is no legal barrier that protects us from a potential \u201cbreakout.\u201d If one side perceives the other is surging, the \u201cRealist\u201d response is to surge in kind.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><b><i>Strategic Blindness: The Death of the \u201cVerification Machine\u201d<\/i><\/b><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">The most immediate and dangerous change does not lie within the number of the bombs, but the <\/span><b>loss of sight <\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">or <\/span><b>transparency<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> from \u201cData to Guesswork.\u201d Between 2011 and 2023, the U.S. and the Russian have exchanged over <\/span><b>25.000<\/b> <b>notifications<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> regarding the movement and status of their nuclear forces (U.S. State Department, 2023). And as of two weeks ago, that ticker has stopped.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">We have lost both \u201cType One\u2019 and \u201cType Two\u201d inspections that have allowed experts to actually stand in a silo to count warheads. With the death of the \u201cVerification Machine,\u201d both sides now must rely solely on their <\/span><b>National Technical Means <\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">(satellites and SIGINT). While advanced, satellites are unable to see through the roof of a bunker, making them nearly unreliable to use to count how many warheads are there.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><b><i>The \u201cWorst-Case\u201d Military Planning<\/i><\/b><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">In the absence of transparency, military planners don\u2019t \u201chope for the best,\u201d they assume the worst, not because they are pessimistic but because they can\u2019t afford the risk. If U.S. intelligence sees a Russian missile base being modernised but is unable to inspect it, they must assume Russia is maximising its warhead count.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">This creates an \u201caction-reaction\u201d cycle. The U.S. modernises to \u201chedge\u201d against Russia, and if China sees the U.S. modernising and accelerates its own 1.000-warhead goal, then China would react to both. Stability is replaced by a permanent state of high-alert anxiety.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\">\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><b><i>Implications for the International System and the Global South<\/i><\/b><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Realism interprets the treaty\u2019s death as an inevitable result of the shift from a <\/span><b>bipolar<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> to a <\/span><b>multipolar <\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">world. U.S. planners argue that by continuing the New START treaty, which is a bilateral treaty, while China rapidly modernises its arsenal, projected to hit 1.000 warheads by 2030, is strategically untenable for the U.S. Without any transparency provided by on-site inspections, both sides would eventually have to assume a \u201cworst-case\u201d scenario, leading to defensive hedging and a potential arms race. It also warns that the loss of a global \u201cguardrail\u201d may provoke middle-power countries that initially stood inside the U.S. \u201cnuclear umbrella\u201d to reconsider their own nuclear status, which would likely happen due to internal pressure to ensure their survival in an unconstrained environment.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Liberalism views the end of said treaty as the catastrophic erosion of the international \u201crule-based\u201d order. The primary danger lies within the collapse of the verification regime. For decades, mandatory data exchanges and on-site served as \u201cinformation stabilisers\u201d aimed to reduce the risk of accidental war. Without the presence of the treaty, there is no legal \u201crulebook\u201d governing 90% of the world\u2019s nuclear warheads. The collapse was further emphasised by the shift toward informal military-to-military \u201cdialogue\u201d rather than binding law, which signals a regression in international cooperation.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">From the viewpoint of the Global South, the treaty\u2019s collapse and end is seen not just as an international security failure but as a violation of the <\/span><b>Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Article VI <\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">\u201cgrand bargain\u201d. Non-nuclear states in the Global South forswore and forbade nuclear weapons in exchange for states that do possess nuclear weapons pursuing disarmament. The death of the New START effectively ends progress toward that said goal, further fuelling a legitimacy crisis in the NPT.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><b><i>Russia\u2019s Willingness to Extend vs U.S. Strategic Recalibration<\/i><\/b><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Moscow\u2019s official stance, articulated by <\/span><b>President Putin <\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">in late 2025 and reiterated by the Russian Foreign Ministry in February 2025, was a proposal to maintain the central quantitative limits by extending the treaty by one additional year, and Moscow framed this as a constructive step to avoid an arms race. However, this offer has its own conditions, Russia requires the U.S. to refrain from taking any steps that can undermine the existing balance of deterrence, aiming towards U.S. advancements in missile defense.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">The White House under the Trump administration, early in 2026, viewed that the New START was an outdated and \u201cflawed\u201d relic of a bipolar world that ignored the trilateral reality. The U.S. argued that any new treaty must include China, which is projected to have 1.000 warheads by 2030. The U.S. also sought modernisation over maintenance rather than a simple extension of the \u201cold and flawed\u201d treaty, the U.S. prioritised its <\/span><b>$946 billion modernisation program and the development of the Golden Dome missile defense system<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">, viewing the treaty constraints as an obstacle to necessary strategic flexibility (CBO, 2025; CRS, 2026).<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><b><i>Experts and Policymaker Concerns<\/i><\/b><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">The primary concern lies within the total loss of the verification regime. Under New START, the U.S. and Russia conducted on-site inspections and exchanged data twice annually. Without these inspections, the U.S. must rely on \u201cNational Technical Means\u201d (e.g, satellite imaging). This could lead to a strategic hedging where, if the U.S. can\u2019t observe how many warheads are on a Russian RS-28 Sarmat missile, planners would assume it is fully loaded.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><b>Barack Obama, the 44th President of the U.S., <\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">warned that the lapse could wipe out decades of diplomatic effort to maintain international stability, signaling a return to the volatile Cold War environment of the early 1960s. Another former president, <\/span><b>Dmitry Medvedev, the 3rd President of the Russian Federation,<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> noted that the expiration of the treaty should alarm everyone, further stating that the \u201ctrust has been exhausted\u201d. On February 5, 2026, high-ranking former officials from the U.S., Europe, and Russia released a joint statement through the <\/span><b>Arms Control Association,<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> warning that we have entered an era of unconstrainedness where both stability and predictability have vanished.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><b><i>Navigating the \u201cThird Nuclear Era\u201d<\/i><\/b><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">The expiration of New START on February 5, 2026, signifies a profound regression in the international security architecture. By moving from a regime of \u201cInstitutional Rigor,\u201d it has regressed back to a legal vacuum, the U.S. and Russia have both traded for a \u201cWild West\u201d strategic ambiguity over a verified certainty. This transition marks the definitive start of the \u201cThird Nuclear Era,\u201d where the binary stability of the Cold War is replaced by a volatile, trilateral competition involving a rapidly modernising China.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">For the <\/span><b>Structural Realist<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> view, the lapse is a pragmatic response to the shift of power, yet it comes with its inherent risk of \u201cWorst-Case\u201d military planning and a three-way arms race. For the <\/span><b>Institutional Liberal, <\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">it represents the catastrophic erosion of a world with a rule-based order, replacing binding law with informal military-to-military dialogues that lack any transparency that is needed to prevent any accidental escalation due to miscalculation or paranoia. Most critically, for the <\/span><b>Global South<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">, the death of the New START is a violation of the NPT\u2019s \u201cGrand Bargain.\u201d It signals that the world\u2019s most powerful states have prioritised trillion-dollar modernisation programs over their legal and moral obligations toward disarmament of nuclear weapons and global development.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Ultimately, the world after New START is one of \u201chigh-alert anxiety.\u201d Without any of the \u201cguardrails\u201d that are provided by on-site inspections and numerical caps, international stability now rests not on the strength of treaties or institutions, but on the fragile technical restraint of individual leaders. The task for the international community is no longer just to extend old treaties, but to build a new, better, multilateral framework that can contain the complexities of a tri-polar nuclear age.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\">\n<h1 style=\"text-align: justify\"><b>Bibliography<\/b><\/h1>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Al Jazeera. (2026, February 5). <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Russia says will act responsibly despite New START nuclear treaty expiry<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">. Al Jazeera. <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/news\/2026\/2\/5\/russia-says-will-act-responsibly-despite-new-start-nuclear-treaty-expiry\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">https:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/news\/2026\/2\/5\/russia-says-will-act-responsibly-despite-new-start-nuclear-treaty-expiry<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Arms Control Association. (2026, February 5). <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Joint Statement from High-Ranking Former Officials and Nuclear Experts Across the Globe on Expiration of New START<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">.<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.armscontrol.org\/pressroom\/2026-02\/joint-statement-high-ranking-former-officials-and-nuclear-experts-across-globe\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400\">https:\/\/www.armscontrol.org\/pressroom\/2026-02\/joint-statement-high-ranking-former-officials-and-nuclear-experts-across-globe<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Associated Press. (2026, February 4). <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Fears loom for a new arms race as the last nuclear pact between the US and Russia expires<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">. AP News. <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/apnews.com\/article\/russia-us-nuclear-weapons-treaty-putin-trump-5b1af24b0b3e65a8acb6ca7153018beb\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">https:\/\/apnews.com\/article\/russia-us-nuclear-weapons-treaty-putin-trump-5b1af24b0b3e65a8acb6ca7153018beb<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Congressional Budget Office. (2025, April 24). <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Projected costs of U.S. nuclear forces, 2025 to 2034<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">.<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.cbo.gov\/publication\/61362\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400\">https:\/\/www.cbo.gov\/publication\/61362<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Congressional Research Service. (2025, September 29). <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Defense primer: The Golden Dome for America<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> (Report No. IF13115).<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.congress.gov\/crs-product\/IF13115\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400\">https:\/\/www.congress.gov\/crs-product\/IF13115<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Congressional Research Service (CRS). (2026, February 6). <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control: Overview and Potential Considerations for Congress<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">.<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.everycrsreport.com\/reports\/IN12640.html\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400\">https:\/\/www.everycrsreport.com\/reports\/IN12640.html<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">IISS. (2026, February 5). <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Cost constraints on the US\u2013Russia strategic nuclear balance after New START<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">. International Institute for Strategic Studies.<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.iiss.org\/online-analysis\/online-analysis\/2026\/02\/cost-constraints-on-the-us-russia-strategic-nuclear-balance-after-new-start\/\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400\">https:\/\/www.iiss.org\/online-analysis\/online-analysis\/2026\/02\/cost-constraints-on-the-us-russia-strategic-nuclear-balance-after-new-start\/<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. (2026, February 4). <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">New START expiration: what it means and what\u2019s next<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">.<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.icanw.org\/new_start_expiration\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400\">https:\/\/www.icanw.org\/new_start_expiration<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Kristensen, H. M., Korda, M., Johns, E., &amp; Knight, M. (2024). World nuclear forces. In <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">SIPRI Yearbook 2024: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">. Oxford University Press.<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.sipri.org\/yearbook\/2024\/07\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400\">https:\/\/www.sipri.org\/yearbook\/2024\/07<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Kristensen, H. M., Korda, M., Johns, E., &amp; Knight, M. (2025, October 31). <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Status of world nuclear forces<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">. Federation of American Scientists.<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/fas.org\/initiative\/status-world-nuclear-forces\/\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400\">https:\/\/fas.org\/initiative\/status-world-nuclear-forces\/<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Lendon, B., &amp; Hansler, J. (2026, February 4). <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">The last major nuclear arms treaty between the US and Russia just expired. Here\u2019s what happens now<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">. CNN. <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/edition.cnn.com\/2026\/02\/04\/world\/new-start-treaty-expiration-nuclear-weapons-intl\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">https:\/\/edition.cnn.com\/2026\/02\/04\/world\/new-start-treaty-expiration-nuclear-weapons-intl<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia (MID). (2026, February 4). <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia Concerning the Expiration of the Russia-US New START Treaty<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">.<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/mid.ru\/en\/foreign_policy\/news\/2076815\/\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400\">https:\/\/mid.ru\/en\/foreign_policy\/news\/2076815\/<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Reuters. (2026, February 4). <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Trump rejects Putin&#8217;s offer of a one-year extension of New START deployment limits<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">. Reuters. <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/china\/new-nuclear-age-beckons-clock-ticks-down-last-russia-us-arms-deal-2026-02-04\/\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/china\/new-nuclear-age-beckons-clock-ticks-down-last-russia-us-arms-deal-2026-02-04\/<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Stimson Center. (2026, January 5). <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Top Ten Global Risks for 2026<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">.<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.stimson.org\/2026\/top-ten-global-risks-for-2026\/\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400\">https:\/\/www.stimson.org\/2026\/top-ten-global-risks-for-2026\/<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (2026, February 4). <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">After New START expires, Europe needs to step up on arms control<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">. SIPRI.<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.sipri.org\/commentary\/essay\/2026\/after-new-start-expires-europe-needs-step-arms-control\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400\">https:\/\/www.sipri.org\/commentary\/essay\/2026\/after-new-start-expires-europe-needs-step-arms-control<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">The Guardian. (2026, February 3). <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Expiry of nuclear weapons pact between US and Russia risks new arms race<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">.<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2026\/feb\/03\/expiry-nuclear-weapons-pact-us-russia-arms-race\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400\">https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2026\/feb\/03\/expiry-nuclear-weapons-pact-us-russia-arms-race<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">United Nations. (1968, July 1). <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">.<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.un.org\/en\/conf\/npt\/2005\/npttreaty.html\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400\">https:\/\/www.un.org\/en\/conf\/npt\/2005\/npttreaty.html<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">United Nations. (2026, February 5). <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">UN chief warns of &#8216;grave moment&#8217; as final US-Russia nuclear arms treaty expires<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">. UN News.<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/news.un.org\/en\/story\/2026\/02\/1166892\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400\">https:\/\/news.un.org\/en\/story\/2026\/02\/1166892<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">U.S. Department of State. (2023). <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">New START Treaty<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">. Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance.<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.state.gov\/new-start-treaty\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400\">https:\/\/www.state.gov\/new-start-treaty<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">U.S. European Command (EUCOM). (2026, February 5). <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">US and Russia agree to resume high-level military-to-military dialogue<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">. <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.eucom.mil\/pressrelease\/44261\/the-us-and-russian-federation-agreed-to-reestablish-high-level-military-to-military-dialog\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">https:\/\/www.eucom.mil\/pressrelease\/44261\/the-us-and-russian-federation-agreed-to-reestablish-high-level-military-to-military-dialog<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Introduction: What is New START? The New START treaty, formally known as Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, has expired as of 5 February 2026, leaving the world without any legally binding limits on both U.S and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals for the first time since the 1972 Strategic Arms [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":48,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1,30],"tags":[152],"class_list":["post-5424","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-articles","category-internasional","tag-artikelhimhi"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/student-activity.binus.ac.id\/himhi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5424","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/student-activity.binus.ac.id\/himhi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/student-activity.binus.ac.id\/himhi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/student-activity.binus.ac.id\/himhi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/48"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/student-activity.binus.ac.id\/himhi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5424"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/student-activity.binus.ac.id\/himhi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5424\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":5427,"href":"https:\/\/student-activity.binus.ac.id\/himhi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5424\/revisions\/5427"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/student-activity.binus.ac.id\/himhi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5424"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/student-activity.binus.ac.id\/himhi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5424"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/student-activity.binus.ac.id\/himhi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5424"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}